Abstract-Sophisticated cyber attacks by state-sponsored and criminal actors continue to plague government and industrial infrastructure. Intuitively, partitioning cyber systems into survivable, intrusion tolerant compartments is a good idea. This prevents witting and unwitting insiders from moving laterally and reaching back to their command and control (C2) servers. However, there is a lack of artifacts that can predict the effectiveness of this approach in a realistic setting. We extend earlier work by relaxing simplifying assumptions and providing a new attacker-facing metric. In this article, we propose new closed-form mathematical models and a discrete time simulation to predict three critical statistics: probability of compromise, probability of external host compromise and probability of reachback. The results of our new artifacts agree with one another and with previous work, which suggests they are internally valid and a viable method to evaluate the effectiveness of cyber zone defense.
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Index Terms-intrusion tolerance; security; modeling; simulation I. INTRODUCTION Mitchell, et al. introduce the concept of cyber zone defense in [11] , [10] and [9] . We extend this prior work in four important ways: First, we relax a simplifying assumption which the prior work made. Specifically, the earlier research assumed nothing impeded cyber attackers' lateral movement within a zone; in this article, we increase the fidelity of the closed-form mathematical models and simulation by introducing friction to intrazone movement with an additional porosity parameter (φ). Second, the foundational studies used two dependent variables to measure the effect of cyber zone defense: probability of compromise (p c ) and what we refer to now as probability of external host compromise (p x ). We add a new measurement to p c and p x called probability of reachback (p r ). Third, the prior research limited the domain of the network size to 1024 hosts; in this article, we extend this domain to 8192 hosts. Fourth, the earlier investigations simulated the progression of a cyber attack iteratively; in contrast, we instrumented a discrete time simulation for this article. This improved simulation Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Approved for unlimited release: SAND2017-1323 C.
technique allows us to control time precisely and more elegantly schedule independent processes (the many legitimate users and attackers).
Our threat model is a sophisticated state sponsored computer network exploitation (CNE) campaign. We assume the adversary has at least one witting (e.g., coerced or compensated) or unwitting (e.g., spearphished) human insider. This type of attacker will carefully spread throughout the victim cyber system to find paths from the resources of interest to the adversary's command and control (C2) site.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First, Section II surveys the state of the art for this topic. Next, Section III proposes closed-form mathematical models and a discrete time simulation. Third, Section IV presents numerical data that quantifies and figures that visualize the performance of the closed-form mathematical models and discrete time simulation. Finally, Section V contains our conclusions from the study and identifies future research topics.
II. LITERATURE SEARCH
Network zoning continues to be an ongoing area of research. In fact, dividing a network into zones is now considered part of the best practice in network security [12] . There has been a lot of work around creating optimal network zones, similar to what is done in [9] . Wu, et al. used user roles and functionality to create a practical network isolation system [15] . Sun and Xie recently proposed an algorithm for network design that creates zones based on access control policies within a network [14] . In both [15] and [14] , the main goal was network design efficiency, not security. [14] wanted to be able to fulfill access restrictions with the most efficient number of virtual LANs (VLANs) and packet filter rules. However, their access control models serve a similar purpose to our security zones by minimizing what an attacker can see, although attacks were not tested in either case.
Creating defensive zones has proven to be useful outside of the realm of traditional networks. A unique paper from Kim, et al. models, simulates and tests dividing a wireless network into zones [7] . As in this paper, they model an internal attacker attempting to exfiltrate secrets from within the network. They defend against it by containing the traffic frequencies with jamming equipment. In the world of hardware, Hategekimana, et al. [4] designed a protection module at the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) level that does pattern matching and support vector machine (SVM) traffic classification in order to detect distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in incoming traffic. The protection module provides zone boundaries at a very low level, serving the role usually filled by a firewall. In a paper that more closely parallels this one, Hu, et al. propose a mechanism to prevent an already-compromised internal host from reaching out externally [6] . However, in this case, the compromised piece is a hardware chip. Their ARM TrustZone isolates trusted hardware (that has access to secrets) and untrusted hardware into zones. The resulting structure is similar to system calls in software, where untrusted hardware must go through a secure call in order to get to the secrets. They test their method against one malicious modification, and their defense was successful, but the study does not contain any formal mathematical modeling or experimental simulation.
Work continues to be done on application isolation and zones in the cloud as well. Shiyao Ma, et al. [8] designed and implemented a tool called Libra, a cluster management framework that isolates applications while maximizing network bandwidth. It differs from previous work in that application containers (VMs) are allocated with consideration to bandwidth, rather than allocating bandwidth after the containers are placed. Again, the focus is not on security, but it helps show the isolation principles modeled in this paper.
This paper contributes insight not only into zones, but also into attack modeling in cyberspace. This too is an active research topic. Some papers, such as [5] and [13] , create generalized models for attack and defense and focus on defining the relevant variables so that the defenders can more easily see the gaps in the system. No simulations or experiments are run with these. Work by Al-Hamadi and Chen [2] simulates adaptive security measures against an opportunistic inside attacker. In this case, they are modeling a smart system whose most valuable asset is functionality, so their defenses (multi-path routing, frequency variation and trust voting) focus on uptime and detection, rather than stopping exfiltration. In November of 2016, Azab, et al. [3] modeled and simulated a defense tool called ESCAPE, which moves a service between Linux VMs (using Docker) when a system call analysis detects a possible attack. They do a simple simulation about the probability of survival of an application container (the thing that is being moved) based on the rate at which hosts are compromised by the attacker. Hosts neighboring a compromised host are at risk of also being attacked in this model, and some number of hosts are assumed to have already been compromised. They showed that the ESCAPE simulated systems had a higher probability of survival than the static systems in this simulation. This is similar to our work because it models the spread of an inside attacker, but they only consider the survival (availability) of a service, and do not model the exfiltration of data. Another paper [16] examines the effect of software diversity on attacks coming from outside the network. It adapts its models from ecology and biodiversity studies. Diversity can both help and harm security depending on the network structure: sometimes more diversity means more attack surfaces, and sometimes it means more steps for the attackers. They work an example and run simulations to test the effect of diversity with their model. The authors confirm that simulated attacks are less successful the higher the diversity measure of the network is.
III. MODELS AND SIMULATION
We propose an updated closed-form mathematical model for p c , a new closed-form mathematical model for p r and a discrete time simulation that predicts p c , p x and p r . p c is the probability an arbitrary host in the network is compromised, p x is the probability an external host in the network is compromised, and p r is the probability an arbitrary host in the network can reach back to the attacker's C2 site. The closed-form mathematical models and discrete time simulation internally cross validate one another. We predict metrics of interest using orthogonal approaches; when the results of fundamentally different techniques match one another, it is less likely there is a major source of bias. Our proposed predictive methods are also consistent with prior results [11] , [10] for p c and p x .
A. Closed-Form Mathematical Model
These closed-form mathematical models are lightweight techniques that provide first-order approximations for three metrics of interest: p c , p x and p r . They are simple to implement and efficient enough to test wide parameter ranges.
Equation 1 shows our proposed closed-form mathematical model for p c . To derive this equation, we begin by considering a single host. This host is compromised if it is exploitable and the insider (cf. our threat model in Section I) can successfully negotiate the intrazone and interzone restrictions in order to reach it. Since we are looking for the probability of the intersection of two independent events (an exploitable host and a visible insider), we multiply their respective probabilities. The former condition happens with probability p e , which is one of the input parameters for the closed-form mathematical model. The latter condition happens in one of two ways. First, the insider can be cozoned (which happens with probability zone size over network size), in which case it has a probability equal to the intrazone porosity of reaching the host. Zone size, z, network size, n, and intrazone porosity, φ, are also input parameters for the closed-form mathematical model. Again, we are looking for the probability of the intersection of two independent events (a cozoned insider and intrazone policy allowing the lateral movement), so we multiply their respective probabilities. On the other hand, if the insider is not cozoned (which happens with probability (n−z)/n), it has a probability equal to the interzone porosity of reaching the host. Intrazone porosity, Φ, is another input parameter for the closed-form mathematical model. Once again, we multiply their respective probabilities because we are looking for the probability of the intersection of two independent events (a non-cozoned insider and the lateral movement penetrating the interzone boundary). Since we are looking for the probability of the union of two mutually exclusive events (the cozoned and noncozoned scenarios), we add their respective probabilities. We assume n − 1 initially uncompromised hosts, so we multiply by this factor. Then we add 1 to account for the initial insider. Finally, we divide by n to normalize the p c .
Equation 2 shows our closed-form mathematical model for p x . We reuse this result from [11] and [10] .
Equation 3 shows our proposed closed-form mathematical model for p r . To derive this equation, we begin by considering a single host. This host can reach back to its C2 site if it is compromised and it can reach a compromised external host. (In Equation 3 , we refer to an external host as a gateway for compactness.) Since we are looking for the probability of the intersection of two independent events (a compromised host and a visible compromised external host), we multiply their respective probabilities. The former condition happens with probability p c , which we modeled earlier. The latter condition happens with probability one minus the probability of the complement of this event: that a host does not have visibility to a compromised external host. A host cannot reach a compromised external host if three conditions are present simultaneously: First, there is no compromised cozoned external host visible (represented by p 1 ). Second, there is no compromised non-cozoned external host visible (represented by p 2 ). Finally, the host itself is not external (represented by p 3 ). Since we are looking for the probability of the intersection of three independent events, we multiply their respective probabilities. p 1 is the probability that all other hosts are missing at least one of four properties: the ability to overcome intrazone friction, compromised, cozoned and external. It is more convenient to consider the complementary event, which yields one minus its corresponding probability. Since we are looking for the probability of the intersection of four independent events, we multiply their respective probabilities. First, a host overcomes intrazone friction with probability φ. Second, a host is compromised with probability p c . Third, a host is cozoned with probability z/n. Fourth, a host is external with probability x/n. There are n − 1 hosts to serve as relay points to the attacker's C2 site, so we raise this expression to the n − 1 power. Similarly, p 2 is the probability that all other hosts are missing at least one of four properties: the ability to penetrate an interzone boundary, compromised, not cozoned and external. Again, it is more convenient to consider the complementary event, which yields one minus its corresponding probability. Since we are looking for the probability of the intersection of four independent events, we multiply their respective probabilities. First, a host penetrates an interzone boundary with probability Φ. Second, a host is compromised with probability p c . Third, a host is not cozoned with probability (n − z)/n. Fourth, a host is external with probability x/n. There are n − 1 hosts to serve as relay points to the attacker's C2 site, so we raise this expression to the n − 1 power. p 3 is the probability the original host considered is not external. This is the number of non-external hosts over the network size.
B. Discrete Time Simulation
Our proposed discrete time simulation provides a high fidelity approach to predict three metrics of interest: p c , p x and p r . It is intended to experiment with a limited number of detailed network configurations. The simulation allows zones of different sizes and specific placement of external hosts. One example of this flexibility is placing a high value target (HVT) in a zone by itself. Another example is aggregating all external hosts in one zone.
We instrumented this discrete time simulation in SimPy [1]. This instrumentation includes host and network classes. The host class attributes include: identifier, zone and status (compromised, external, exploitable, attacked and detected). If a host is compromised but not detected, every 24 hours the adversary will attempt to propagate from it to a random host that has not already been attacked or detected. The simulation contains many (up to 8192 for this paper) instances of this host class. The network class attributes include: network size, zone size, interzone and intrazone porosity and external host count. The network has no active component. The simulation contains exactly one instance of this network class and runs until there are no more viable (not previously attacked and not detected) hosts in the network. Table I consolidates all of the parameters that guide the closed-form mathematical models and simulation. Selecting n, z and x are straightforward. In [10] we proposed techniques to estimate p e and Φ. Estimating φ could follow a similar technique as for Φ.
IV. RESULTS
Figures 1 through 4 show consistency with [11] and [10] . We set intrazone porosity (φ in this article) to 1.0 for these figures in order to replicate the conditions in the earlier papers. Visually, the closed-form mathematical model (now enhanced with the intrazone porosity parameter) predictions match the results of the proposed discrete time simulation. Numerically, the mean squared error (MSE) for p c is 4.928 × 10 −5 . probability of exploit = 0.9 (simulation) probability of exploit = 0.5 (simulation) probability of exploit = 0.1 (simulation) probability of exploit = 0.9 (model) probability of exploit = 0.5 (model) probability of exploit = 0.1 (model) Fig. 2 . Probability of compromise versus zone size and pe. Figure 5 demonstrates the internal validity of the proposed φ parameter with respect to p c . Intuitively, the intrazone links should be more porous than the interzone links; that is, φ should be greater than or equal to Φ. Based on this intuition, we set Φ to 0.1 and vary φ between 0.1 and 0.9. Visually, the closed-form mathematical model (now enhanced with the intrazone porosity parameter) predictions match the results of the proposed discrete time simulation. Again, the MSE for p c is 4.928 × 10 −5 . Figures 6 through 9 also show consistency with [11] and [10] . Again, we set φ to 1.0 for these figures in order to replicate the conditions in the earlier works. Visually, the closed-form mathematical model predictions match the results of the proposed discrete time simulation. Numerically, the MSE for p x is 2.293 × 10 −4 . Figures 11 through 15 show how the proposed discrete time simulation predicts the proposed probability of reachback (p r ) metric. Numerically, the MSE for p r is 2.121 × 10 −3 . Figure  11 shows that a smaller n corresponds with a higher p r . This is because the threat associated with insiders is amortized over a larger total population. p r appears to be a linear function of z where the network size governs the slope. (Of course, there is an asymptote at p r = 1.) probability of exploit = 0.9 (simulation) probability of exploit = 0.5 (simulation) probability of exploit = 0.1 (simulation) probability of exploit = 0.9 (model) probability of exploit = 0.5 (model) probability of exploit = 0.1 (model) Fig. 12 . Probability of reachback versus zone size and pe. Figure 12 shows that a larger p e corresponds with a higher p r , which is intuitive. p r appears to be a linear function of z where the probability of exploit governs the slope and yintercept. Figure 13 shows that a larger x corresponds with a higher p r , which is intuitive. p r appears to be a linear function of z where the number of external hosts governs the y-intercept. Figure 14 shows that a larger Φ corresponds with a higher p r , which is intuitive. p r appears to be a linear function of z where the interzone porosity governs the y-intercept. Figure 15 shows that a larger φ corresponds with a higher p r , which is intuitive. p r appears to be a mild sigmoid function of z.
Throughout Figures 1 through 15 the simulation results tend to undulate as they move across the domain. This is an artifact of how we instrumented the simulation. These periodic rises occur when an increased zone size prompts the network suddenly (zone count is discrete, not continuous) to have one less zone than it did for the previous value of z. For example, given a network size of 4096, a zone size of 255 yields 17 zones, but a zone size of 256 yields 16 zones. At these points on the domain where the number of zones drops, we expect to see a rise in the attacker-facing metrics p c , p x and p r .
V. CONCLUSIONS
We are optimistic that the proposed closed-form mathematical models and discrete time simulation provide accurate means to predict the performance of a cyber zone defense. These latest enhancements are consistent with previous results and increase the fidelity of the earlier artifacts by relaxing more simplifying assumptions and collecting a more germane metric.
We are pursuing a number of related research topics. First, we make a large simplifying assumption in this paper: once a host is compromised, it remains attached to the network and compromised forever. In future work, we will add intrusion detection and compromise remediation to the closed-form mathematical models and discrete time simulation. Second, we will study additional attacker-facing metrics like host and system-level persistence. Given the widespread concern about advanced persistent threats (APTs), this will help quantify just how enduring these attackers are. Third, we will study the defender-facing metrics (economic implications in particular) of cyber zone defense. This will give system managers the ability to consider the tradeoff between operational and financial cost and security. Integrating the dynamic cyber zone defense algorithm proposed in [9] will provide some of these defender-facing metrics. Fourth, we will experiment with propagation delays other than 24 hours.
